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A recent theory proposes that arousal amplifies the competition between stimulus representations, 
strengthening already strong representations and weakening already weak representations in 
perception and memory. Here, we report a stringent test of this arousal-biased competition theory 
in the context of visual attention and short-term memory. We examined whether pre-trial arousal 
enhances the bottom-up attentional bias toward physically salient versus less salient stimuli in a 
multi-letter identification task. Arousal was manipulated by presenting an arousing versus neutral 
picture (Experiment 1) or sound (Experiment 2) at the start of each trial. Bayesian statistics 
revealed strong evidence for the null hypothesis in both experiments: arousal did not modulate 
the effects of physical salience on letter identification. The experiments were repeated with EEG 
measurements and subjective stimulus ratings, which confirmed that the stimuli successfully 
manipulated physiological and subjective arousal. These results pose a challenge for the arousal-
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Arousal, the global state of activation of our central and autonomic nervous system, is one of the 
driving forces in human cognition and behavior. Stable individual differences in global arousal 
level can shape temperamental traits and contribute to psychopathology. In addition, global 
arousal level shows large intra-individual fluctuations, not just those expressed in the sleep-wake 
rhythm, but also on a much faster time scale: moment-to-moment, spontaneous as well as task-
related, fluctuations that have large effects on cognition, behavior, and the underlying brain 
circuitry (Cavanagh, Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014; Eldar, Cohen, & Niv, 2013; Mather & 
Sutherland, 2011; Murphy, Vanderkerckhove, & Nieuwenhuis, 2014; Nassar, Rumsey, Wilson, 
Parikh, Heasly, & Gold, 2012; Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Sørensen, Vangkilde, & 
Bundesen, 2015). These fluctuations in arousal, which occur even in the face of constant sensory 
stimulation, give rise to substantial variability in task performance and cortical state—sources of 
variability that are often treated as a nuisance or noise. A better understanding of these effects of 
arousal will therefore allow psychologists and neuroscientists to account for large portions of 
hitherto unexplained variance in their data.  
According to a recent proposal arousal level boosts the competition during decision-
making between representations that have high priority (e.g., because of bottom-up salience or 
top-down task relevance) and representations that have lower priority (Mather & Sutherland, 
2011; see also Hockey & Hamilton, 1970, Smith, 1985). Accordingly, arousal amplifies the 
contrast between weak and strong neural inputs, thus strengthening already existing biases in 
perception and memory. Computational modeling studies (Eldar et al, 2013; Eldar, Niv, & 
Cohen, 2016) and neurobiological knowledge (Mather, Clewet, Sakaki, & Harley, 2016) suggest 
that these “winner-take-more/loser-take-less” dynamics are caused, at least in part, by the 
norepinephrine-mediated changes in global gain that accompany arousal. Recent research has 





begun to yield evidence for the arousal-biased competition (ABC) theory, showing for example 
that increases in arousal enhance perceptual learning of highly salient stimuli (Lee, Itti & Mather, 
2012; Sakaki, Fryer & Mather, 2013) and of stimulus features that match a person's attentional 
predisposition (e.g., a bias toward visual or semantic information; Eldar et al., 2013), while 
impairing learning of lower-priority stimuli.  
The goal of the present study was to test ABC theory by examining the effects of arousal 
on bottom-up attentional biases, focusing in particular on a previous study in the domain of visual 
attention and short-term memory (Sutherland & Mather, 2012). Sutherland and Mather played 
negative (arousing) or neutral sound clips from the International Affective Digital Sound set 
(IADS; Bradly & Lang, 2007) to observers, before flashing brief arrays of letters. Observers were 
instructed to report as many letters as possible. The letters were of either high or low contrast, 
such that high-contrast letters would receive high priority due to their physical salience, and low-
contrast letters would receive lower priority. Importantly, on each trial the display contained three 
high-contrast and five low-contrast letters, forcing the signals to compete for limited processing 
resources. In this situation, ABC theory predicts that if the arousal level of observers is 
heightened before viewing the letter display, this will boost the competitive advantage of letters 
that already have high priority in a “winner-take-more”/“loser-take-less” manner. Therefore, an 
observer should be biased even more in favor of the high-contrast letters, and this shift in 
priorities would necessarily be at the expense of priority given to low-contrast letters, due to 
limitations in processing capacity (Bundesen, 1990), as well as visual short-term memory 
capacity, typically estimated to be 3-4 items in young healthy participants (e.g., Cowan, 2001; 
MacAvinue, et al., 2012; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008).  





Sutherland and Mather’s (2012) results confirmed this prediction: under arousal high-
contrast letters were reported correctly more often, while low-contrast letters were reported less 
often. Importantly, there was no difference in the number of correctly reported letters overall, 
which supports the notion that arousal biases the allocation of attention, but does not affect the 
size of the visual short-term memory (VSTM) store that encodes the stimuli. This finding 
highlights a potential problem in Sutherland and Mather’s data analyses. They applied factorial 
repeated-measures ANOVAs to their data, with the independent factors type of sound (negative 
vs. neutral) and visual contrast (high vs. low), and calculated main effects and the interaction 
effect of these factors on the probability of correct letter report. Given that VSTM is of a more-
or-less fixed size (Cowan, 2001; MacAvinue, et al., 2012; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 
2008), a signal processing bias towards stimuli with high bottom-up or top-down priority will 
increase the number of correctly reported stimuli of that type, which will necessarily lead to a 
lower number of correctly reported low-priority stimuli. In other words, the numbers of correctly 
reported high- and low-priority stimuli are not independent of each other; when presented 
simultaneously, the two types of stimuli are forced to share a fixed amount of processing and 
memory resources. As a result, the interaction terms in Sutherland and Mather’s ANOVAs, 
which were presented as a key measure of arousal-biased competition, are hard to interpret in that 
they essentially count the same effect twice: once as enhanced recall of high-contrast letters, and 
then again as impaired recall of low-contrast letters—two sides of the same coin.  
In the analyses reported below, we captured the bias towards high-priority stimuli and the 
bias against low-priority stimuli in a single measure, which we compared between arousing and 
neutral trials using frequentist and Bayesian t-tests. We also report a re-analysis of the original 





data of Sutherland and Mather (2012), which shows that using this more appropriate measure 
does not change the outcome of their experiments.  
 We present the results of two main experiments modelled on the original experiment by 
Sutherland and Mather (2012). Experiment 1 was an attempt at replicating the results of the 
original paper, using a different arousing stimulus set: pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), while Experiment 2 was a close replication of 
the original experiment, using IADS sounds (Bradly & Lang, 2007). Both experiments tested the 
prediction that arousal boosts the competition between physically salient, high-priority stimuli 
and less salient, low-priority stimuli, thus increasing the selectivity of bottom-up attention.  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was designed to test whether pre-trial arousal enhances the bottom-up 
attentional bias toward physically salient versus less salient stimuli in a multi-letter identification 
task. In contrast to Sutherland and Mather (2012), who used IADS sound clips to manipulate 
arousal, we used negative and neutral IAPS pictures (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). A 
disadvantageous property of the IADS digital sound set, is that it is much smaller than the IAPS 
picture set (167 sounds vs. 1182 pictures). This makes it difficult to define large and well-
delineated categories of stimuli based on arousal and/or valence ratings. Conversely, the IAPS 
picture set allows the selection of relatively large selections of pictures with a high degree of 
dissimilarity in arousal and valence ratings. Figure 1 compares the arousal and valence ratings of 
the IADS and IAPS stimulus sets, and highlights the samples used in the present experiments. 
Because we were able to construct picture categories with a larger distance in arousal ratings, we 
assumed that, if anything, our arousal manipulation would be stronger than that of Sutherland and 





Mather. Indeed the highly arousing IAPS pictures used here are known to cause robust 
sympathetic arousal responses, such as increased pupil dilation and skin conductance (Bradley, 
Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008), and have repeatedly been demonstrated to elicit a large late 
positive potential (LPP), an electrophysiological arousal response (e.g., Cuthbert, Schupp, 
Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Brown, van Steenbergen, Band, de Rover, & Nieuwenhuis, 




Thirty-nine participants (26 female), aged 19 – 30 (mean = 23.5, sd = 2.7) participated in 
Experiment 1. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color vision. 
Participants were compensated with €4 or course credit.  They were informed of the rights of 
human participants, in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute of Psychology at Leiden University (CEP 
number 9501177439). 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The experiment ran on Windows 7 desktop computers. Stimulus presentation and data collection 
were conducted in MATLAB, using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, 
Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were presented on a white background (r = 255, g = 
255, b = 255) on a CRT monitor set at a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Viewing distance was 
approximately 60 cm. The target stimuli were capitalized letters in the Arial Bold typeface, 





subtending 3.4˚ of visual angle (height). The letter displays were adopted from Sutherland and 
Mather (2012). There were eight target letters on each trial, presented against a white background 
(Figure 2): three high-contrast, or dark, letters (r = 102, g = 102, b = 102) and five low-contrast, 
or light gray, letters (r = 204, g = 204, b = 204). Observers were instructed to report as many 
letters as possible, regardless of stimulus contrast. Observers performed 10 practice trials before 
performing the experimental task. The letters were presented in a circular array with a radius of 
9°, measured from the center of the fixation cross to the center of each letter. On each trial eight 
letters were chosen at random from the English alphabet (excluding the letter I).  
Arousal was manipulated by presenting highly arousing negative pictures and neutral 
pictures from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2008). The arousing 
pictures had a very low valence rating and high arousal rating (Lang et al., 2008), while the 
neutral pictures had a medium valence rating (neither positive nor negative) and a low arousal 
rating. Each category consisted of 36 pictures (see Table 1), each of which was shown once 
during a full experimental session, which consisted of 72 trials.  
To make sure that there were no major physical differences between the two picture 
categories, we calculated perceived luminance of each pixel by applying the equation: Li = .213 * 
Ri + .715 * Gi + .072 * Bi, where Li is the luminance of a pixel i, and Ri, Gi and Bi represent the 
normalized input to each color channel for that pixel of the display. The parameters of the 
equation emulate the sensitivity of human vision to light of different wavelengths (Rec. 709 
standard), and yield a luminance value as a ratio of full luminance of a computer monitor. The 
average luminance of each picture was calculated by aggregating the luminance value of each 
pixiel. Average luminance was then compared between the arousing and neutral picture 
categories. Furthermore, we computed the root mean square error of the pixel luminance to get a 





coarse measure of picture contrast, and compared between picture categories. Welch-corrected 
independent samples t-tests did not reveal any differences in perceived luminance (t(70) = -.17, p 
= .86) or in root mean square contrast (t(70) = -1.29, p = .20).  
Pictures, subtending 15.2° by 11.9° of visual angle, were presented in the center of the 
screen, and subsequently masked by a visual noise mask of the same size, made up of a matrix of 
256 by 256 achromatic pixels of random luminance (see Figure 2).  
 
Table 1. Identification numbers of all IAPS pictures and IADS sounds used in the current experiments.  






2683, 2811, 3000, 3010, 3030, 3053, 3059, 3060, 
3068, 3069, 3071, 3080, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3131, 
3150, 3170, 3212, 3400, 3500, 3530, 6313, 6315, 
6560, 8485, 9050, 9183, 9187, 9250, 9410, 9413, 
9414, 9810, 9910, 9921.  
  
Neutral 
2036, 2102, 2104, 2190, 2221, 2393, 2397, 2411, 
2513, 2840, 2850, 2870, 2890, 2980, 7001, 7026, 
7030, 7032, 7034, 7038, 7040, 7041, 7050, 7052, 
7140, 7150, 7160, 7161, 7179, 7185, 7205, 7217, 
7300, 7500, 7547, 9210. 
     






106, 115, 134, 244, 255, 260, 276, 279, 282, 283, 
289, 292, 420, 501, 600, 624, 626, 711, 712, 730. 
  
Neutral 
102, 113, 130, 132, 170, 225, 246, 250, 252, 322, 
358, 373, 375, 377, 382, 701, 708, 720, 723, 728. 
      
 
 






Figure 1. A scatterplot of all A) IAPS pictures and B) IADS sounds, plotted by arousal and valence/pleasure ratings 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007; Lang et al., 2008). The colored symbols (* and +) reflect the pictures and sound clips 
included in the current experiments, while the gray circles represent the remaining pictures and clips in the database. 







Figure 2. The progression of a trial in Experiment 1, which was similar to that of Sutherland and Mather (2012). See 
Methods for details. 
 















































Observers were instructed about the task upon arrival in the lab. The procedure of the experiment 
was explained by an illustrative figure, similar to Figure 2. Observers were told that their task 
was to report as many target letters as possible, and to ignore the distractors. Then they 
performed 20 practice trials on which no IAPS picture was presented. 
 A typical trial procedure is illustrated in Figure 2. Each trial began with a fixation cross in 
the center of the monitor for 4 seconds, followed by the presentation of an IAPS picture. The 
picture presentation was terminated after 1 second by a visual noise mask (500 ms). Thereafter, 
the fixation cross appeared again for an interval of varying duration (250 – 2500 ms). The 
combined durations of the noise mask and subsequent fixation period matched that of Sutherland 
and Mather (2012) and was deemed appropriate to minimize spillover of arousal effects The long 
fixation period matched that of Sutherland and Mather (2012), and was deemed appropriate to 
minimize spillover of arousal effects across subsequent trials. Indeed, several papers have 
reported clear behavioral (Demanet, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2012; Kristjánsson, Óladóttir & 
Most, 2013; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) and EEG effects (Bradley & Lang, 2000; Brown 
& Cavanagh, 2017; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis) of arousal in experimental designs with intermixed 
neutral and arousing IAPS pictures, and intertrial intervals that were shorter than in the current 
study. Finally, the letter display appeared for 200 ms, followed by a “Recall Now” display. This 
message prompted the participant to type in the identities of all remembered target letters. When 
the participants had exhausted their remembered letters, they initiated the next trial by pressing 
the spacebar. 
 






To avoid the problem of interdependence between the numbers of high and low-contrast letters 
reported from the same limited capacity memory store, we defined a novel primary dependent 
measure. This was the ratio between the proportion of correctly reported low-contrast targets and 
proportion of correctly reported high-contrast targets. This yields the attentional weight of a low-
contrast target, relative to that of a high-contrast target, which is how it will be referred to, 
henceforth. Using this measure, we ensured that inferential statistics were performed on a single 
summary measure.  
The primary analyses were Bayesian paired-samples t-tests (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009) performed using JASP (JASP team, 2018), using the default Cauchy 
prior width (.707). Robustness analyses were performed using JASP and the BayesFactor 
package for R (version 0.9.12; Moray & Rouder, 2015). The aim in each experiment was to keep 
on testing participants until we had strong evidence for or against arousal-biased competition. 
Strong evidence is the descriptor of a Bayes factor of 10 or higher (suggested by Jeffreys, 1961), 
meaning that the collected data is 10 times more likely under the HA than H0, or vice versa. A key 
strength of the Bayesian approach is that it enables us to quantify evidence for both the 
alternative and the null hypothesis (for more information on Bayesian alternatives to frequentist 
statistics, see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Morey & Rouder, 2011; Rouder et al, 2009; Verhagen, & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). Furthermore, Bayesian inference is immune to the problems associated 
with optional stopping of data sampling (e.g. Wagenmakers, 2007), which allows the researcher 
to monitor the strength of evidence, until it is sufficiently compelling (Rouder, 2014). Therefore, 
we did not rely on a priori power calculations in the current study, but decided on a criterion for 





what we consider compelling evidence, for or against the alternative hypothesis: a Bayes factor > 
10.  
Results  
The left panel of Figure 3 shows the average probabilities of reporting a target as a function of 
visual contrast (high vs. low) and type of picture (neutral vs. negative). The data presentation is 
equivalent to that of Figure 2 in Sutherland and Mather (2012, p. 1370), but the numerical pattern 
is reversed: under arousal there is a slight decrease in the proportion of correctly reported high-
contrast letters, and an increase in low-contrast letters. To circumvent the methodological 
problems described in the Introduction, we did not perform independent analyses for the high- 
and low-contrast letters. Instead we examined the relative attentional weight of a low-contrast 
letter (see Methods).  
 
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 1, shown as proportion correct for low- and high-contrast targets (left), and as the 
relative weight of low-contrast targets (right). Error bars represent 1 SEM.  
 





A paired-samples t-test comparing the weights of low-contrast letters did not reveal a 
significant effect of type of picture (negative vs. neutral; t(38) = -1.487, p = .15, d = -.24). Also, 
the small numerical trend was in the opposite direction of arousal-biased competition, meaning 
that, if anything, presenting a negative arousing picture increased, rather than reduced, the weight 
of the low-contrast targets. A Bayesian paired-samples t-test classified the evidence against the 
alternative hypothesis as strong, with a Bayes factor of 13.4 for H0, relatively to HA.  
To make sure that these results could not be attributed to the larger number of trials in our 
study (72, compared to 40 in Sutherland and Mather, 2012), we re-analyzed the data after 
excluding trials 41-72. This led to the same outcome (BF01=13.4 for H0).  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 failed to reveal evidence for ABC theory (Mather & Sutherland, 2011), despite 
being a close replication of the original study of Sutherland and Mather (2012), with the 
exception of the arousing stimuli used (pictures vs. sounds). In Experiment 2, we ran an almost 
exact replication of the experiments presented by Sutherland and Mather (2012; Experiment 1 
and 2, condition 1), with the same arousing stimuli (IADS sound clips), letter displays and 
number of trials, in an attempt to confirm or exclude an important role for the type of arousing 
stimuli.  
 







Forty-one observers (32 female), 19 – 31 years old (mean = 23.7, sd = 3.1), participated in the 
experiment. Participants from Experiment 1 were excluded from participation. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color vision. Participants were compensated 
with €4 or course credit. One participant dropped out due to discomfort.  
 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli and apparatus were identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Sound 
stimuli were presented with Sennheiser HD202 headphones. Each IADS sound clip was 6 
seconds long, compared to the 1 second presentation of IAPS pictures in the previous 
experiments. Figure 2 describes a typical trial in Experiment 2, if the picture and noise mask is 
replaced by a fixation cross and 6 second long sound clip. We used the same 40 sounds as 
Sutherland and Mather (2012). The sound numbers are listed in Table 1. Figure 1B shows the 
arousal and pleasure ratings of each sound (collected by Bradley & Lang, 2007). The sounds that 
formed the neutral and negative category did not differ significantly in terms of mean peak 
amplitude (-3.3 and -3.6 dB, respectively, t(38) = -.857, p = .397), but did differ in terms of 
average RMS power (t(38) = - 3.149, p = .003; a full list of sound properties is provided in Table 
4 of Bradley & Lang, 2007).  
 






The left panel of Figure 4 shows the average proportion of correct low- and high-contrast targets. 
As in the previous experiment, the numerical pattern of results was in opposition to that in 
Sutherland and Mather’s (2012) experiments, in that high-contrast letters were slightly less likely 
to be reported following negative arousing sounds than following neutral sounds. The weight of 
low-contrast distractors did not significantly differ between sound types (t(39) = -.919, p = .36, d 
= -.15). A Bayesian paired-samples t-test yielded a Bayes factor of 10.5 in support of H0: the data 
were 10.5 times more likely under the hypothesis that arousal had no effect on the competition 
between high- and low-priority letters, than under the hypothesis of an arousal-related increased 
bias for selecting high-contrast letters.  
 
 
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 2, shown as proportion correct for high- and low-contrast letters (left), and as the 
relative weight of low-contrast targets (right). Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
 





Experiments 3A and 3B – Manipulation checks 
Experiments 1 and 2 did not reveal evidence for arousal-biased competition. Although our 
experimental designs were highly similar to those of Sutherland and Mather (2012; 2015), it is 
possible that our arousal manipulations were not effective in our study population. To exclude 
this possibility we re-ran Experiments 1 and 2, with the addition of electroencephalography 
(EEG), to check whether the arousal manipulation worked. If the picture and sound stimuli 
successfully modulated arousal in our participants, we expected to find modulations of the 
electrophysiological LPP component (Cuthbert et al., 2000, Brown et al., 2012). Furthermore, we 
asked all participants to provide subjective arousal and valence ratings of each picture and sound.  
 
Methods 
Experiments 3A and B were identical to Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, with the following 
exceptions.  
Participants 
Thirty-two volunteers participated in the experiments. In Experiment 3A, the mean age of 16 
observers (14 female) was 22.2 years (sd = 2.9). In Experiment 3B, the mean age of 16 observers 
(11 female) was 21 year (sd = 1.8). Participants were compensated with course credits or a cash 
payment (€ 7.5). 
 
EEG acquisition and analysis 
Electroencephalographic measurements were performed using a 64-channel BioSemi recording 
system. Recordings were limited to 17 scalp channels (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, CP1, CPZ, CP2, 





P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, Oz, O2), and the left and right mastoids. Eye movements were recorded 
with two pairs of bipolar electrodes on the observer’s right eye (HEOG, VEOG). Offline 
processing was performed with the EEGlab toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) for MATLAB. 
The data were re-referenced to the mastoid electrodes. The data were filtered using a band-pass 
filter (cut-offs: 0.1 Hz and 30 Hz), visually inspected for the presence of clear artifacts, and 
subjected to an independent components analysis. Components were rejected and a second low-
pass filter was applied (cut-off: 8Hz). Data cleaning procedures led to an average of 1.1 trial 
reduction in Experiment 3A (IAPS; range: 0 – 6 trials), and 1.6 trials (range: 0 – 6) in Experiment 
3B (IADS). Event-related potentials (ERPs) were calculated from baseline-corrected data, split 
into epochs locked to the onset of the picture or sound stimuli. Trial averaging was performed 
separately for each stimulus category (neutral or negative) and each of the centroparietal 
electrodes (CP1, CPz and CP2), where the LPP is known to be prominent (e.g., Ásgeirsson & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2017; Brown, et al., 2012; Hajcak, Dunning & Foti, 2009; Schupp, Cuthbert, 
Bradley, Cacioppo, Ito & Lang, 2000).  
  
Subjective ratings of stimuli  
After the experimental session, the observer was asked to rate each picture or sound in terms of 
arousal and valence on scales from 1-9. They typed the rating numbers using the numbers pad of 
a regular keyboard. IAPS pictures were visible until arousal and valence ratings were performed. 
A silhouette of a loudspeaker was visible while each IADS sound was played. Ratings of sounds 
were performed immediately after each sound clip ended. 
  







Data were analyzed with the same methods as in Experiments 1 and 2. For Experiment 3A, a 
paired-samples t-test revealed a significant difference in the weight of a low-contrast letter 
between the negative and neutral conditions, but in the opposite direction of what is predicted by 
ABC theory, t(15) = -2.92, p = .011, d = -.73 (Figure 5). A paired-samples Bayesian t-test yielded 
a Bayes factor of 11.7 against the hypothesis that arousal biased attention towards high-contrast 
letters. For Experiment 3B, the t-test did not reveal a differences between conditions, t(15) = -.42, 
p = .68, d = -.10, and the Bayes factor suggested medium-strength evidence for the null 
hypothesis (BF01 = 5.2).  
 
 
Figure 5. Behavioral results from Experiments 3A and B, shown as proportions of correctly reported high- and low-
contrast letters (panels A and C), and as mean weights of a low-contrast letters (panels B and D), aggregated across 
all participants.  
 
EEG measurements 
ERPs were averaged across the three centroparietal electrodes: CP1, CPz and CP2, separately for 
each observer and stimulus category. For Experiment 3A, a t-test on the averaged data in the time 
window between 400 and 600 ms following picture onset revealed a significant arousal 

























































































































previous studies of the LPP, which is usually near its maximum in this period (Codispoti, Ferrari 
& Bradley, 2006; Hajcak et al., 2009; Schupp et al., 2000). This suggests that negative pictures 
increased cortical arousal. 
 
 
Figure 6. The event-related modulations of centroparietal brain activity by IAPS pictures (A) and IADS sounds (B). 
The time windows chosen for statistical analysis are highlighted by gray backgrounds. 
 
An analogous analysis was performed for the ERPs obtained in Experiment 3B. However, 
this analysis was somewhat exploratory, since there is little literature on arousal modulations of 
evoked potentials by IADS sounds. The time window chosen for the analysis was 800-1200 ms 
after stimulus onset. The exploratory results mirrored those of the IAPS experiment, albeit with a 
smaller effect size, t(15) = 2.84, p = .012, d = .71.  
Subjective ratings 
To test whether the participants found the pictures in the pre-defined negative stimulus category 
to be more arousing than pictures in the neutral category, the ratings of each participant were 
averaged across the two stimulus categories. A paired samples t-test confirmed that IAPS pictures 





in the negative category were considered more arousing than those in the neutral category, t(15) =  
12.47, p < .001, d = 4.4. An analogous analysis of IADS ratings also confirmed that negative 
sounds were rated as more arousing than sounds from the neutral category, t(15) = 6.6, p < .001, 
d = 1.0.  
 Average subjective ratings were also compared to the means of norm ratings provided by 
Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert (2008) and Bradley and Lang (2007) for the IAPS pictures and IADS 
sounds, respectively (Figure 7). IAPS ratings were very consistent with norm ratings: Arousal 
ratings correlated highly with the arousal ratings of the norm population, r(70) = .979, p < .001, 
and so did valence ratings, r(70) = .981, p < .001. IADS ratings were also highly correlated with 
norm ratings on the arousal, r(38) = .859, p < .001, and valence, r(38) = .879, p < .001, 
dimensions.  
 
Figure 7. The average ratings made by observers in Experiments 3A and B. Pre-defined categories are represented by 
circles (neutral stimuli) and diamonds (negative arousing stimuli). Norm ratings are included for comparisons 
(triangles; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008; Bradley & Land, 2007).  
 






Experiment 3A demonstrated that arousing IAPS pictures evoked a robust LPP modulation in 
observers performing the same task as that used in Experiment 1. In addition, post-test ratings of 
picture stimuli confirmed that the observers found pictures in the negative category much more 
arousing than pictures in the neutral category. Despite the large physiological arousal response 
and subjective reports, participants’ behavior was opposite to the predictions of arousal-biased 
competition: Exposing observers to arousing pictures made them more likely to report low-
contrast letters.  
 In Experiment 3B arousing IADS sounds evoked a significant LPP modulation, that was 
less robust and delayed in time compared to the LPP modulation in Experiment 3A. Subjective 
ratings also confirmed that negative sounds were found to be more arousing than neutral sounds, 
but the categorical delineation was not as clear as it was for pictures. The reduced LPP 
modulation was to be expected, since interpretation of some IADS sounds requires integration of 
information over time, which would necessarily delay arousal responses on some trials. 
Furthermore, both norm ratings (Bradley & Lang, 2007) and the self-ratings obtained here 
suggest that IADS sounds are not as reliably arousing as IAPS pictures (which motivated 
Experiment 1). Yet, the overall conclusion is that the arousal manipulations were successful in 
Experiments 3A and B, and therefore presumably also in Experiments 1 and 2, which used 
procedures identical to the control experiments.  
 A re-analysis of the data from three studies of Sutherland and Mather  
In the Introduction of the present paper, we discussed a problem with the way data were analyzed 
in the original study of Sutherland and Mather (2012). Because we used a different analysis 





procedure, we wanted to assess the data of Sutherland and Mather using the same procedure. 
Therefore, we obtained the publicly available data from three studies by Sutherland and Mather 
(2012, 2015, 2018), calculated weights of low-contrast distractors, and ran Bayesian t-tests. 
 First, we used data from the original publication (Sutherland & Mather, 2012, pooled data 
from Experiments 1 and 2, condition 1), collected from 110 participants (18-29 years old) in an 
experiment identical to Experiment 2 in the present report. The purpose of the analysis was to 
quantify the evidence for or against arousal-biased competition. A Bayesian t-test on the weights 
of low-contrast stimuli revealed strong evidence for arousal-biased competition (BF10=12.0 for 
HA; weight difference = .054).  
Then, we ran the same analysis on the data of 55 participants from an ageing population 
(61-80 years old; Sutherland & Mather, 2015). The data from one participant were discarded due 
to extreme weights, which were more than 7 standard deviations from the group mean in one of 
the conditions. Although the data show a numerical trend towards the direction predicted by ABC 
theory, the Bayesian paired-samples t-test on the remaining 54 participants did not yield much 
evidence for arousal-biased competition in the ageing group. In fact, the Bayes factor revealed 
that the data were about twice as likely under H0 (no arousal-biased competition) than under HA 
(BF01=1.9; weight difference = .018).  
Finally, we re-analyzed data from 55 young and healthy participants (18-29 years old) 
reported in Sutherland and Mather (2018), who were subjected to the same task procedure as in 
the studies mentioned above, except that the design included both pleasant positive and 
unpleasant negative arousing sounds. When Sutherland and Mather compared the trials with 
arousing and neutral pictures, categorized based on the published arousal norm ratings for the 
included sounds, they found no effect of arousal level on the bias toward reporting salient, high-





contrast letters. However, when they conducted analyses based on the participants’ own (post-
hoc) arousal ratings of each sound, they found that sounds with higher self-rated arousal ratings 
were consistently associated with greater bias towards reporting high-contrast letters. In our re-
analysis based on pre-defined picture categories, we found a Bayes factor of 5.5 in support of the 
null hypothesis (i.e., against arousal-biased competition). A re-analysis based on the self-rated 
valence and arousal ratings yielded a Bayes factor of 4.9 in support of the ABC hypothesis. These 
Bayesian comparisons of the weights of low-contrast distractors thus mirror the results of the 
frequentist statistical results of Sutherland and Mather (2018). 
Bayes factor robustness check 
The reported evidence against a reliable arousal-linked bias towards high-priority stimuli is based 
on Bayes factors, obtained from the Bayesian analog to paired-samples t-tests (Rouder, et al., 
2009). This method of analysis demands an assumption about the prior distribution of effect 
sizes, which is, in most cases, not known. In the Results sections of both experiments, we 
presented Bayes factors obtained under the assumption of a neutral Cauchy prior of width .707. 
This assumption may be disputed, but due to the scarcity of data on arousal-biased attention in 
brief multi-element displays, it is difficult to propose a clearly superior alternative. Here, we 
assess the robustness of the current analyses, by using uninformed, and informed priors.  
 First, we estimated the evidence for the null hypothesis over a large range of priors. This 
was done by obtaining Bayes factors for the full range of prior widths, from .1 to 1.5 (Figure 8). 
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on three prior widths, which we categorically name narrow, 
medium and wide priors. This analysis revealed Bayes factors > 5.5 in both experiments under the 
assumption of a narrow prior, while Bayes factors under the assumption of medium and wide 





priors were all > 10 (Table 2). The analysis shows that, under a wide range of plausible 
assumptions about the distributions of effect sizes, the evidence lends moderate to strong support 
in favor of the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 2. Bayes factors (BF01) under three different prior widths.  
Experiment Cauchy prior width 
  narrow (.354) medium (.707) wide (1.0) 
1 6.98 13.35 18.72 
2 5.54 10.45 14.62 
 
 
Figure 8. Bayes factors for Experiments 1 and 2, estimated over a range of Cauchy prior widths 
(.1 – 1.5). Vertical lines mark categorically defined priors: narrow, medium and wide. 
 
 Second, we performed a final analysis of the data, using a prior based on the posterior 
distribution obtained from the re-analysis of Sutherland and Mather’s (2012) data, and a method 
adopted from Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014). Hitherto, our Bayesian analyses compared the 
effect sizes of sampled data to a prior distribution of effect sizes with a maximum density around 





0. Conversely, the method employed here asks whether the current effect size (i.e., from 
Experiments 1 and 2) is similar to what was found before (Sutherland & Mather, 2012) or 
whether it is absent (equality of effect size Bayes factor test; Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014, p. 
1464). We pitted the null hypothesis: the effects sizes are equal, against the alternative 
hypothesis: the true effect size is smaller than the effect size obtained by Sutherland and Mather 
(2012). The Bayesian t-test of the original effects size (Sutherland & Mather, 2012), after 
conversion to weight ratios (see Experiment 1, Methods) yielded a posterior distribution with a 
median of .386, and 95% confidence intervals of .117 - .655. This posterior distribution was 
approximated by using a normal distribution with a mean of .386, and standard deviation of .137. 
When Bayesian t-tests were repeated, using the informed prior distribution, the resulting inverse 
Bayes factors were 37.9, and 22.9, for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. These results present 
strong support for the hypothesis that the true effect sizes are smaller than the effect size obtained 
by Sutherland and Mather (2012). 
 
General Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to test ABC theory (Mather & Sutherland, 2011; 
Mather et al. 2016) by examining the effects of transient changes in arousal on bottom-up 
attentional biases and visual short-term memory. In two experiments we examined if arousal 
boosts the competition between physically salient, high-priority stimuli and less salient, low-
priority stimuli, using arousing and neutral pictures (Experiment 1) and sounds (Experiment 2) to 
manipulate arousal. Using Bayesian statistics, we found strong evidence for the null hypothesis in 
both experiments: increased arousal did not boost the bottom-up bias towards reporting high-





contrast letters. So, we were unable to replicate the “winner-take-more/loser-take-less” signature 
of arousal-biased competition. 
We used the same task as used in Sutherland and Mather (2012): report as many letters as 
possible, regardless of stimulus contrast. In Experiment 1 we used negative IAPS pictures that 
according to norm ratings were more reliably arousing, and neutral pictures that were less 
arousing than the arousing and neutral IADS sound clips used by Sutherland and Mather. 
Experiment 2 was an almost exact replication of Sutherland and Mather’s experiments, using the 
same sound clips as arousing and neutral stimuli. Therefore, we were surprised by the null results 
in both experiments. Indeed, when we reanalyzed the original data from Sutherland and Mather’s 
experiments using our composite measure of “winner-take-more/loser-take-less” effects, 
Bayesian statistics indicated strong evidence for arousal-biased competition in the younger 
population, while results were not diagnostic in the older population. 
  What might account for these large discrepancies? One possibility that we considered is 
experimenter bias: a researcher's cognitive bias may cause him to subconsciously influence the 
participants of an experiment. Given the computerized instructions and little interaction between 
the experimenters and our participants, we find it hard to imagine that the experimenters 
influenced the study outcome. Furthermore, Experiment 1 was carried out at a time when the 
experimenters still expected to get results consistent with arousal-biased competition. So the 
results from those experiments are unlikely to reflect the experimenters’ expectations. 
 Another subtle difference in task design or study context between our experiments and 
those of Sutherland and Mather’s (2012) concerns the task instructions. We forgot to include one 
of their instructions: “due to the difficulty of the task it was emphasized that participants should 





be less concerned with avoiding errors and more concerned with recalling letters” (p. 1368). 
However, this does not seem to have affected the way our participants approached the task; 
the average number of correctly reported letters in our Experiment 2 was 3.75, very similar to the 
average number of 3.85 in the original experiments.  
 Another potential cause of the discrepancy might be systematic differences between the 
participant samples. Although two control experiments confirmed that our arousal manipulations 
were successful, it is hard to exclude the possibility that our sample of participants—most or all 
were students at Leiden University—was less aroused by these manipulations than the 
participants tested by Mather and colleagues, who do not specify the population from which 
participants were sampled. For example, differences in the way research groups advertise a study, 
and mention the use of disturbing auditory sound clips, might cause a selection bias, for example 
by affecting the probability that individuals high and low in harm avoidance sign up for the 
study; and traits such as harm avoidance can affect the impact of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli 
on the performance of cognitive tasks (e.g., Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005). Future studies 
on arousal-biased competition should chart relevant personality variables of the participants and 
examine if these can explain individual differences in the presence and degree of arousal-biased 
competition. 
 In line with our current findings, we recently found that pre-trial arousal neither enhanced 
nor impaired selectivity in a focused visuospatial attention paradigm (Ásgeirsson & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2017), suggesting that arousal does not amplify the effects of top-down biases. Yet, 
we believe that there is substantial evidence that arousal level modulates the strength of pre-
existing biases, including those associated with stimulus salience (Mather et al., 2016), 
attentional predisposition (Eldar et al., 2013, 2016), cognitive control (Warren et al., 2016), 





expectation (Hockey, 1970; Smith, 1985), as well as a number of more subtle biases (de Gee et 
al., 2017; Urai et al., 2017). However, the exact circumstances under which these effects of 
arousal occur, or the direction of these effects, are still poorly understood. Future studies should 
include subjective or physiological trial-to-trial arousal measurements, to examine arousal-biased 
competition on a finer time scale and taking into account item-related arousal differences 
(Sutherland & Mather, 2018). Future research should also aim to delineate which effects of 
arousal on attentional selectivity are related to arousal per se (i.e., regardless of valence; 
Sutherland & Mather, 2018) and which are limited to negative valence (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2010; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2011). While these factors were confounded in the 
current study, a recent study made a first attempt at dissociating these factors, using the same task 
but including positive in addition to negative and neutral IADS sounds (Sutherland & Mather, 
2018). Importantly, the impact of stimulus salience on task performance was modulated by 
arousal, but not by valence ratings. Finally, a computationally tractable modelling framework will 
be necessary to generate and test more precise predictions about arousal-biased competition 
(Warren et al., 2016). 
 
Data are available at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.6510302.v3 
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Figure 1. A scatterplot of all A) IAPS pictures and B) IADS sounds, plotted by arousal and 
valence/pleasure ratings (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Lang et al., 2008). The colored symbols (* and 
+) reflect the pictures and sound clips included in the current experiments, while the gray circles 
represent the remaining pictures and clips in the database. Note that the sound clips in panel B are 
the same as those used by Sutherland and Mather (2012).  
 
Figure 2. The progression of a trial in Experiment 1, which was similar to that of Sutherland and 
Mather (2012). See Methods for details. 
 
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 1, shown as proportion correct for low- and high-contrast 
targets (left), and as the relative weight of low-contrast targets (right). Error bars represent 1 
SEM.  
 
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 2, shown as proportion correct for high- and low-contrast 
letters (left), and as the relative weight of low-contrast targets (right). Error bars represent 1 
SEM. 
 
Figure 5. Results from Experiments 3A and B, shown as proportions correct for high- and low-
contrast letters.  
 
Figure 6. The event-related modulations of centroparietal brain activity by IAPS pictures (A) and 
IADS sounds (B). The time windows chosen for statistical analysis are highlighted by gray 
backgrounds. 
 
Figure 7. The average ratings made by observers in Experiments 3A and B. Pre-defined 
categories are represented by circles (neutral stimuli) and diamonds (negative arousing stimuli). 
Norm ratings are included for comparisons (triangles; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008; Bradley 
& Land, 2007).  
 
Figure 8. Bayes factors for Experiments 1 and 2, estimated over a range of Cauchy prior widths 
(.1 – 1.5). Vertical lines mark categorically defined priors: narrow, medium and wide. 
 
 
